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Abstract
We study the dynamic support for fiscal decentralization in a po-
litical agency model from the perspective of a region. We show that
corruption opportunities are lower under centralization at each period
of time. However, centralization makes more difficult for citizens to
detect corrupt incumbents. Thus, corruption is easier under centraliza-
tion for low levels of political competition. We show that the relative
advantage of centralization depends negatively on the quality of the
local political class, but it is greater if the center and the region are
subject to similar government productivity shocks. When we endoge-
nize the quality of local politicians, we establish a positive link between
the development of the private sector and the support for decentraliza-
tion. Since political support to centralization evolves over time, driven
either by economic/political development or by exogenous changes in
preferences over public good consumption, it is possible that voters are
(rationally) discontent about it. Also, preferences of voters and the
politicians about centralization can diverge when political competition
is weak.
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1 Introduction
In many countries the delivery of important public goods is often done by
a politically accountable regional government. However, the degree of con-
trol over the decision on the level and the type of public goods varies across
countries and over time.1 The aim of this paper is to understand the degree
of autonomy over public good provision between central and regional govern-
ments and, importantly, to identify mechanisms explaining how this evolves
over time or may differ across countries.
This issue of where should the decision and delivery of the public good
reside is certainly not a new one in the literature. The traditional trade off
basically goes in this way: a decentralized structure will take better account
of the preferences of the people but it will impose coordination costs, when
there are externalities or scale advantages in the delivery of the public good
(Oates, 1972). More recently, the literature on decentralization and corruption
posed some additional interesting trade-offs. An argument favoring decentral-
ization is that it is associated with greater accountability (Tomassi and Wein-
schelbaum, 2007; Seabright, 1996). This argument is stronger if individuals
observe the provision of public good in other regions and use this information
to evaluate their local politicians (Besley and Case, 1995) and also in the pres-
ence of sufficiently strong political competition (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) or
press freedom (Lessmann and Markwardt, 2009). Besides, centralization can
generate undesired conflicts of interest between regions if decisions are made
1A recent study by the OECD shows that the degree of decentralization varies greatly
across OECD countries. Furthermore, the level of decentralization evolves with no clear
pattern and in a non-monotonic fashion. While in the last years, countries like Mexico,
Spain and the US have delegated more responsibilities to sub-central administrations, the
contrary has occurred in France and Japan (Blo¨chlinger, 2006). Whereas some countries
constantly revise their level decentralization, others, like Germany, delegated decision mak-
ing to sub-national administrations decades ago. The decentralization process in Latin
America is illustrative of a erratic quest for the optimal level of decentralization. Countries,
like Argentina and Brazil, initiated a wave of re-centralization in the late nineties, after be-
ing the champions of decentralization in the developing world (Eaton and Dickovick, 2008).
Arguably, the move toward decentralization may also be associated with the secessionist
wave observed in many regions and the formation of new countries around the world. The
intensity of these movements also varies over time and across countries (Spolaore, 2008).
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by a central legislature which may be reflected in an inefficient and unequal
degree of central provision of the public good (Besley and Coate, 2003). These
positive features of decentralization may counterbalanced by a greater danger
of corruption and rent seeking associated with the fact that local governments
are easier to be captured by local elites (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000, 2005,
2006).
The recognition that the delivery of public goods is often done at the
regional level by a politically accountable authority implies a new trade off as-
sociated with the decision between centralization and decentralization.2 Given
that the delivery of public goods is carried out by regional authorities even
when decisions are made by a central government, centralized schemes offer an
unexplored advantage. A central authority which determines the public good
provision at sub-central levels has an advantage due precisely to the lack of di-
rect control of the local outcomes. Thus, the center can mandate a level/type
of public good that is detached from the potentially biased self-interest of
sub-central politicians.3
But an unexplored disadvantage of centralization emerges once the selec-
tion of politicians is considered. If the provision of public good reveals to
some extent the type of the local government, centralization makes it more
difficult to detect that type. As a consequence, it facilitates the re-election
of potentially corrupt incumbents. Hence a tradeoff may arise, as centraliza-
tion can reduce temptations to the local politicians at the expense of reducing
the capacity of elections to select better politicians. We add to this trade off
the classical disadvantage of centralized regimes. That is, central authorities
make worse informed decision than local politicians and therefore they impose
a provision of public goods that is less well tailored to the local interests. The
2In various countries local authorities are responsible for the provision of public good.
This seems to be independent on whether the decisions are centralized. France is a good
example combining centralized decisions with decentralized execution.
3We can avoid thus the assumption of that politicians of the central government are more
altruistic (as in Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) or more talented, as stated by John Stuart
Mill more than a century ago in the following way: “the local representative bodies and their
officers are almost certain to be of a much lower grade of intelligence and knowledge, that
Parliament and the national executive” (quotation taken from Treisman (2002)).
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workings of this augmented trade off become nontrivial and interesting once
embedded it in a dynamic analysis of the political process.
Our analysis rests on the following premises:
• We consider a situation where two levels of government, the center and
the region, can potentially take decisions over the provision of public
good and we compare two main different fiscal schemes. These schemes
differ in who decides the level of provision, and, thereby, the payoff
consequences of those decisions.
• The center and the region suffer from productivity shocks that affect the
government capacity to provide public goods. The realizations of these
shocks are private information for each government. The occurrence of
these shocks in the center and the region is imperfectly correlated. This
implies that the central government can decide a sub-optimal level of
public good from the regional perspective.
• Under centralization, a central agency decides the level of public good
to be provided in the region, taxes accordingly and delegates the imple-
mentation of public good provision to local politicians (variations to this
form of centralization are also discussed). Local politicians have private
information about the actual cost of delivering this good (different states
of the world would determine different optimal levels of provision). How
they use this informational advantage depends on their type, the polit-
ical process and the level of fiscal autonomy. We consider two types of
local politicians, those motivated by ego/pride-rents (and hence honest,
in this model) and those materially motivated (which in this model can
lead to dishonesty).
Since the states of nature in the center and the region may differ, the
center may make inappropriate decisions for the region. When his signal
is that the state of nature is good (costs are low), the center mandates
a high level of public good. When the signal is that the state of nature
is bad (costs are high), the mandate is to provide a low level of public
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good. When the signals are mismatched with the true state of the nature,
local politicians must either have insufficient funds to meet the central
requirements or receive excessive taxation for their needs, which they
can pocket (if dishonest) or use as a signal of honesty in order to be
re-elected.
• Under decentralization, decisions are taken by the local government. In
this case, honest local politicians provide the socially optimal amount of
the good, at the appropriate cost. The dishonest local politicians always
pretend the public good is expensive, provide a low amount of the good
and personally pocket the difference when it is not expensive.
• Regional authorities are elected and can potentially be re-elected. Voters
read in the provision of the public good the type of the incumbent. They
then use this information in their decisions on whether to re-elect the
incumbent or vote for a challenger. Is in this sense, that decentralization
allows better selection of politicians. To incorporate this feature, we
develop a political agency model with probabilistic voting that elaborates
on Besley and Smart (2007).
We first characterize the conditions under which centralization is preferred
to decentralization. As a result of the trade off as well as its interaction with
the political process, decentralization is preferred by the citizens for sufficiently
low correlation between the center and the region, sufficiently high probability
of the good state of nature and, importantly, sufficiently high quality of the
political class.
The model generates a subtle effect of decentralization on corruption. At
a purely static level, the opportunities of corruption are greater under decen-
tralization. On the other hand, precisely because of these opportunities, it
is easier for voters to identify the incumbent’s type and therefore expel the
dishonest incumbent from office. Thus, centralization reduces the selection
effect of elections. A dishonest incumbent can be re-elected in some states of
nature, which gives him a second chance to extract corruption rents, provided
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the level of political competition is sufficiently low. This way we add to an
open debate about the effects of decentralization on corruption.4
We then endogenize the quality of politicians and associate the development
of the private sector with the quality of the political class. This identifies a
channel through which the political support to centralization/decentralization
may vary over time and differ across regions. Building on Besley’s intuitions
(Besley, 2005), we offer a formal treatment of the willingness to gain political
office. Changes in the distribution of income to be earned in the private sector
affect the opportunity cost of becoming a politician. Whether this discourages
rent seekers from becoming politicians depends on whether corruption rents
are lower than the pride derived by benevolent politicians when holding office.
Hence, when the utility value of corruption rents is smaller than that of the
ego rents, the proportion of honest politicians in increasing in the level of
development of the private sector. The conditions for this result are satisfied by
a number of income distributions. Importantly, it holds for the log normal and
pareto distributions; the functions that more accurately describe the actual
distribution of incomes around the world. This result implies that the support
for decentralization may increase as the economy develops.
To see whether shifts in the support to decentralization, caused either by
economic or political development or exogenous shifts in citizens’ preferences
over public good consumption, lead to a demand for new constitutional ar-
rangements, we determine the level of social discontent over the centralized
regime. Discontent takes place when a majority of citizens prefer a move
toward decentralization but their number is not enough to trigger a consti-
tutional reform. We show that individuals might have even internalized this
possibility when designing a constitution that establish a centralized distribu-
tion of the decision power over public good.
We end our analysis by exploring another source of citizens’ disaffection
with the political and fiscal system. We show that it is possible to generate
situations in which politicians, independently of their type, impose central-
ization and do not respond to the demand for a change in the direction of
4For a review see Bardhan and Mookherjee (2005).
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decentralization.
These results provide insight to a number of different real world issues and
related to a number of literatures.
We focus on the evolution of attitudes vis-a-vis centralization. This can
explain the move toward decentralization in many countries, like Spain, UK,
Italy, South-Africa and many others, the return to centralization in others, like
France, Brazil and Argentina, and the existence of more stable systems like
the decentralized scheme in Germany. Arguably, the creation of new countries
and the push toward secession in some others, could be an associated phe-
nomenon. In our model, these trends occur via the impact of development on
the quality of the political class which determines in turn the relative benefits
of decentralized constitutional arrangements.
Our results have implications for the constitutional process of the Eu-
ropean Union. Opponents to the Treaty of Lisbon often emphasize that it
implies centralization and undermines local democracy. In a way, the move
toward “more Europe” implies that member countries resign portions of their
sovereignty. Ganuza and Hauk (2004) show that economic integration receives
more support from citizens in societies characterized by higher levels of polit-
ical corruption. They also provide supporting evidence suggesting a negative
relationship between the corruption perception index and the desired speed
of integration, as measured by the Eurobarometer. Our model can also ex-
plain this relationship, although we show that it might be mediated by other
factors, such as: political competition, the relative strength of potential cor-
ruption rents versus the politicians’ career concerns, or the population age
distributions.
Contrary to most previous research, we emphasize the impact of economic
conditions on the political viability of decentralization. In this sense, decentral-
ization can be a consequence of both economic development and improvements
in the quality of the political class or changes in public good consumption.
This induces a note of caution in interpreting cross country evidence on the
relationship between decentralization, corruption and growth.5 Specifically, it
5See, for example, Treisman (2000).
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is not necessarily true that decentralization causes less corruption and more
growth. In fact, the empirical literature provides conflicting evidence. While
Fisman and Gatti (2002); Barenstein and de Mello (2001) find a positive ef-
fect of decentralization, Treisman (2002) finds the opposite result.6 This is
important to the extent to decentralization is often recommended to devel-
oping countries as a device to promote growth and reduce corruption (World
Bank Independent Evaluation Group, 2008).
As we analyze the support for centralization from the perspectives of both
citizens and politicians. We are able to identify a potential divorce between
what voters want and what they are offered by the political class in terms
of the organization of the country or the region. That political parties only
partially and slowly respond to shifts in public opinion is well known in political
science literature (e.g. Adams, Clark, Ezrow, and Glasgow (2004)). At the
supranational level, the EU provides a good example of conflictive views over
integration between mainstream politics and a large mass of the population
(Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries, 2005)
As emphasized by Hindriks and Lockwood (2009), the literature on cen-
tralization and decentralization has generally overlooked the electoral account-
ability aspects of different fiscal schemes. They show that these different fiscal
schemes have different effects on the capacity of elections for selecting and
disciplining politicians. In particular, they show that centralization reduces
de capacity of selecting good politicians. For this reason, centralization is the
preferred fiscal system in situations where the quality of political class is low.
Our analysis provides another perspective from a similar framework as we ex-
plore complementary characteristics of centralized and decentralized schemes
and their impact on the evolution their associated political support.
Inasmuch our model shows how the evolution of the private sector influ-
ences the quality of the political class, this paper makes a contribution to the
literature on the quality of government as well as to the growing literature on
political careers (Besley, 2005; Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Keane and Merlo,
6Treisman (2002) argues that the reason of the discrepancy is the use of a different set
of controls, which suggests that the relationship is not fully robust.
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2007; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008). We share the obvious and common fea-
ture that the quality of politicians decreases in their opportunity cost. In our
model, the development of the private sector increases the opportunity cost
of holding office. The impact of higher private wages will affect politicians
differently according to whether they are rent or ego seekers. We show that
rent seekers react more rapidly and therefore leave politics quicker in situa-
tions where potential corruption rents are sufficiently low. In this case, the
development of the private sectors increases the quality of the political class.
Conversely, when corruption is high, a more attractive private sector reduces
the quality of politicians. This result shows that the effect of the relative wage
in the public sector compared with the private sector may be either positive, as
in Caselli and Morelli (2004) and Messner and Polborn (2004), or negative, as
in Mattozzi and Merlo (2008), conditional on the level of potential corruption
rents.
To recapitulate, this paper is organized in the following way. Section 2
presents the model, characterizes the solutions for both centralization and
decentralization and shows that the support to decentralization increases in
regional divergences and the quality of the local political class. In section 3,
we introduce the possibility of rational discontent. Section 4 examines the
potential divorce between voters and politicians and shows that the citizens’
support to decentralization may be unrepresented for low levels of political
competition. We conclude in section 5 where we discuss some variations to
the model.
2 Model
We analyze an economy, the region. There are two fiscal authorities, the
region and the center.7 Citizens derive utility from a public good (G) and
money. Each individual gets income from their labor market participation
and pays taxes to the government. The government uses tax revenues to
7In theory, this could also be a country and a supranational structure.
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fund the provision of the public good but can to take part of it for personal
consumption.
The capacity of providing the public good (θj) depends on the state of the
nature, only observed by the government. This can be either H or L, where
θH > θL with probabilities p and 1 − p, respectively. In the state j ∈ {H,L}
the per capita cost of providing one unit of the public good is θ
− 1
2
j . Thus, the
per capita tax required to provide G is τ ≥ Gθ−
1
2
j .
Voters’ utility takes the form ui = 2G
1
2 − τ +wi. The optimal public good
provision is given by G∗ = arg max 2G
1
2 −Gθ−
1
2
j + wi. It follows that a social
planner who knew θj would provide G
∗ = θj and would collect τ ∗ = θ
1
2
j .
We view government through the lens of the political agency model.8 This
involves some typical ingredients. There is a principal-agent relationship be-
tween voters and government. The principal is constituted by the voters who
delegate the decision making to the government, the agent. The government
has private information on the state of nature. In our case, this is about the
state capacity to provide public goods (θi). The informational advantage pro-
vides the possibility for the politician in office to behave opportunistically. As
the motives for holding office are not purely altruistic, a problem of account-
ability emerges. Elections offer a possibility to (at least partially) reward or
punish governments suspected of dishonest behavior. Voters observe taxes and
public good provision and employ this information to form an opinion concern-
ing the incumbent’s type. If citizens infer that the government might not be
honest, the incumbent is not reelected and voters elect another candidate. Ac-
tions in office can also signal honesty. As we will show in the analysis below,
an incumbent interested in re-election will find opportunities to demonstrate
honesty. In these cases, the incumbent is re-elected. In other circumstances,
the voters can not infer the type of the politician in office and the incumbent’s
chances of win the election are the same as for any other candidate. Finally,
there will cases where the provision of public good is uninformative and hence
the incumbent can run for re-election with the same probability of wining as
any other challenger.
8Besley (2006) offers a comprehensive discussion of political agency models.
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There are three dates, 0, 1 and 2. In the first date (t = 0), the region holds
a referendum on whether to accept a centralization plan. Under centralization,
the center determines the public good provision, collects taxes from the region,
transfers the corresponding funds to the government of the region, and then the
regional government executes the center instructions. Under decentralization,
the government of region decides the level of public good and tax accordingly.
In the following period (t = 1), the citizens elect a politician. As there is
no incumbent, a candidate is randomly elected. In t = 2, the citizens make
an inference about the quality of the incumbent and vote accordingly. If the
incumbent is not reelected, a challenger is randomly chosen.
2.1 Decentralization
Politicians/citizens come in two breeds. One of those breeds derives ego or
pride rents from office (the E-type henceforth). An E-type obtains utility
∆ each period in office. The E-types are concerned about how history will
judge them (or their future careers). After leaving office, if history finds the
politician behaved in a dishonest way, with some probability δ, the ego rents of
the E-type politician go away. This possibility induces the E-types to behave
as an honest social planner. Thus, an E-type in office provides GH = θH and
GL = θL depending on whether nature is H or L.
The other breed of politicians, the R-type, only cares about monetary
compensation. For this reason, an R-type in office may behave dishonestly
in situations where corruption rents are possible. Under decentralization, this
happens whenever the state of nature is H. Since the government holds an
informational advantage, the R-type in office can provide G = θL even if the
nature was H, and pocket the corresponding corruption rents. The corruption
rents are given by
CR = θ
1
2
L − θ
− 1
2
H θL = θ
1
2
L
(
1− θ−
1
2
H θ
1
2
L
)
(1)
Notice that equation (1) implies an upper bound on the value of corrup-
tion. This is because corruption in this model is exclusively determined by the
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informational advantage of being in office. If the value of the public good was
lower than θL, it would be evident that the government incurred in corruption
activities which would trigger audits and, eventually, punishment.
We call WH and WL the welfare under high provision and low provision
of public good, respectively. Since we assume individuals to be identical, for
the time being, WH and WL are
WH = 2θ
1
2
H − θ
1
2
H = θ
1
2
H
WL = 2θ
1
2
L − θ
1
2
L = θ
1
2
L
Notice that an R-type in government will always provide G = θL, which is
inefficient whenever the nature is H. On the other hand, E-types will always
provide the efficient level of public good. Thus, voters would ideally elect an
E-type.
The types of the candidates are not observable. That means that a candi-
date is randomly elected in t = 1. The proportions of E-types and R-Types
that run for office are given by pi and 1− pi, respectively. In our analysis, we
will interpret pi as the quality of the regional political class.
After one period in office, the incumbent can be reelected. Voters observe
the level of public good and update their prior beliefs about the incumbent’s
type. A re-election takes place if the posterior probability that the incumbent
is of an E-type is greater than the prior probability of electing a challenger of
an E-type (i.e. pi). How do voters update their beliefs about the incumbent’s
type? This depends on how much can be inferred from the public good provi-
sion. First, if the level of public good provided in t = 1 were θH , then voters
would correctly infer that the incumbent is of an E-type with probability one
and the incumbent would be re-elected. If the level of public good provision
were θL, voters would know that the state of nature is L with probability 1−p
and therefore they would assign the incumbent a probability (1 − p) × pi of
being of an E-Type. As this is obviously lower than pi, they would not re-elect
the incumbent and a challenger would be randomly elected.
We may summarize the ex-ante expected welfare under decentralization
(WDC) as:
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WDC = pip(H + pH + (1− p)L) +
pi(1− p) (L+ pi (pH + (1− p)L) + (1− pi)L) +
(1− pi) (L+ pi (pH + (1− p)L) + (1− pi)L) ,
which simplifies to
WDC = pip (2 + p (1− pi))H + (2− pip (2 + p (1− pi)))L
2.2 Centralization
Under centralization, the center decides the level of public good to be provided
to the region, collects taxes accordingly and transfers the funds to the regional
government. The regional government in turn uses the transfer to provide the
public good. As the center does not execute the provision of public good,
the central decisions on its level are disinterested and efficient according to
the state of nature observed in the center θˆj, with j ∈ {H,L}. However, the
states of nature in the center and the region may differ, or the center can
only partially observe the state of the nature in the Region. To capture this,
we allow probabilities associated with each state to differ. The probabilities
associated with θˆ are defined by PH = P [θˆ = θH/θ = θH ] and PL = P [θˆ =
θH/θ = θL].
9 Consequently, the probability structure is as follows:
Region/Center θˆH θˆL
θH pPH p(1− PH)
θL (1− p)PL (1− p)(1− PL)
It is important to note that this probability structure can also reveal in-
formation about the type of the central government. Although we emphasize
that corruption rents are lower for central than for local authorities, it might
9This is a simple way to give an informational advantage to the regional authorities.
Any information (or communication) structure which preserved such advantage would yield
similar results.
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be possible for the central government to retain funds from the region in order
to generate corruption rents. In our model, this would be the case of a central
government imposing G = θL irrespectively the state of the nature. That is,
PL = 0 and PH = 0. Thus, we can rationalize dishonesty in the central pro-
vision of public good as a low correlation between the state of nature in the
center and in the region. We shall discuss below the effects of this correlation
on the comparison between centralization and decentralization.10
We wish to understand the incumbent’s behavior in each of the four re-
sulting situations. We assume no incumbent advantage. This is important
because there will be situations where the provision of public good does not
reveal any information about the incumbent’s type and therefore an incumbent
of whatever type will be able to run for re-election with the same probability
of being elected as the challengers.
2.2.1 Welfare under Centralization
We begin by analyzing the welfare under each combination of θ and θˆ.
• Situation H. With probability pPH , the center determines G = θH
and collects t = θ
1
2
H . As the center transfers sufficient funds, both types
of regional government are bound to provide the high level of public
good. A lower provision would trigger an inspection from the center
where the misuse of funds may be discovered and punished. Hence, the
regional government provides G = θH and the utility of the citizens in
the region corresponds to WH . Since the provision of public good does
not reveal any information about the incumbent’s type, the challenger
and incumbent have the same probability of being elected in the next
election.
10The probability structure can also reflect situations where the local government re-
nounces the informational advantage and reveals the true state of the nature to the central
government, either by benevolence or Party discipline. Although we prefer not develop
this possibility, note that effective information sharing will simply imply a high correlation
between θi and θˆi.
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• Situation I. With probability (1− p)PL, the center determines G = θH
and collects t = θ
1
2
H to be transferred to the region. However, the true
state of the nature in the region is θL. That means that the transfers
from the center can only fund a level of public good G = (θHθL)
1
2 . Utility
in this case is
W I = 2 (θHθL)
1
4 − θ
1
2
H . (2)
A lower level of public good provision may again initiate audits by the
center which, in this this situation, would confirm that the state of nature
in the region prevented the government from fully executing the center’s
instructions. Hence, the incumbent’s type is not revealed, which allows
the incumbent to run again for office and be re-elected with the same
probability of winning than any of the challengers.
• Situation O. With probability p (1− PH), the center decides G = θL,
and collects t = θ
1
2
L to be transferred. However, the state of nature in
the region is H. This allows whoever is in office to behave strategically.
The R-type receives instructions and funds to provide G = θL. As
the cost of providing the public good is lower in the Region than what
is perceived in the Center, it is possible to provide G = θL and keep
the remaining funds for personal use. The potential rents to extract
are θ
1
2
L − θL
θ
1
2
H
, which coincide with the corruption rents identified for the
case of decentralization. Notice that this case arises with probability
p(1− PH)(1− pi) and that the implied utility corresponds to WL. Since
G = θL is consistent with the instructions given by the center, there will
no monitoring by the center. However, voters will update their beliefs
about the incumbent’s type in a way that they will prefer to elect a
challenger. To see why, notice that, as in the case of decentralization,
the probability of being of an E-type after providing G = θL for an
incumbent is lower than the one associated with the challengers.
The E-type has an opportunity to signal his type by providing a higher
level of public good than instructed. In this case, the provision of public
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good reveals that the incumbent is of an E-type with probability 1, which
guarantees re-election. Thus, with probability p (1− P )pi, the provision
of public good is G = (θHθL)
1
2 with t = θ
1
2
L and the utility becomes
WO = 2 (θHθL)
1
4 − θ
1
2
L .
• Situation L With probability (1−p) (1− PL), the center decides G = θL
and t = θ
1
2
L which is optimal according to the state of nature in the region
being L. Neither type of politician in office can offer a level of public
good different from θL and therefore Utility under this state is W
L. In
this situation, voters cannot discern the reasons behind the decision of
providing θL given that they cannot observe the state of nature in the
Region. Therefore, as θL, may also be the level provided by an R-type
in situation O, voters will prefer a challenger to the incumbent and re-
election becomes impossible.11
This description of centralization rules out any degree of local fiscal au-
tonomy like the possibility for an honest incumbent to increase taxes in the
situation O or returning taxes in the situation O, which would be more efficient
from the regional perspective. Note that we could straightforwardly relax the
level of centralization to incorporate this possibility in our analysis but, as it
will be clear below, our message would remain unchanged.
Collecting these observations, we can express welfare in the first period
under centralization as:
WCE1 = pPHW
H + (1− p)PLW I + p(1− PH)piWO + (3)
[(1− p)(1− PL) + p(1− PH)(1− pi)]WL
Welfare in the second period only differs in the case where an E-type was
identified as the efficient provision of public good is guaranteed. In this case
11The voters’ beliefs yielding this electoral behavior are explained in more detail in section
2.1.
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welfare in t = 2 is
WCE2 |p(1− PH)pi = pPHWH + (1− p)PLW I + (1− p)(1− PL)WL +
p(1− PH)(1− pi)WO + p(1− PH)piWO;
that is,
WCE2 |p(1− PH)pi −WCE1 = p(1− PH)(1− pi)
(
WO −WL) (4)
Using (4), we can summarize the expected welfare associated with central-
ization as
WCE = 2WCE1 + (p(1− PH))2 pi (1− pi)
(
WO −WL)
Which after plugging in (3) we obtain
WCE = 2
[
p
(
PHW
H + (1− PH)WL
)
+ (1− p) (PLW I + (1− PL)WL)]+
(2 + p(1− PH) (1− pi)) p(1− PH)pi
(
WO −WL)
2.3 Comparison Centralization and Decentralization
It is clear that centralization has pros and cons from the regional perspective.
On the one hand, natures in the Center and Region might not be perfectly
correlated, centralization may impose an inefficient level of public good because
the center may determine G = θH in situations where the state of nature in
the region is L. This situation occurs with probability (1− p)PL.
But on the other hand, centralization reduces the corruption opportunities
in each period. To see this, notice that corruption takes place under decentral-
ization with probability p(1 − pi). Under centralization, corruption case arise
with probability p(1− PH)(1− pi), which is obviously lower than p(1− pi).
To see the influence of the correlation more clearly, notice that a perfect
correlation between θˆj and θj implies PH = 1 and PL = 0. In this case, the
17
probabilities of an state with either corruption or inefficient provision of public
good under centralization are zero. Thus, we have
Proposition 1 The relative benefit of centralization increases with the level
of correlation between the states of nature in the center and in the region.
The benefits of decentralization logically increase with the quality of the
local political class. To see this, we can express WDE −WCE as
WDE −WCE = pip (2 + p (1− pi)) (WH −WL)− (5)
(2 + p(1− PH) (1− pi)) p(1− PH)pi
(
WO −WL)+
2WL − 2p (PHWH + (1− PH)WL)
+2 (1− p) (PLW I + (1− PL)WL)
We differentiate 5 with respect to pi we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 The relative benefit of centralization decreases with the quality
of the regional political class.
Proof We need to show that
∂(WDE−WCE)
∂pi
> 0. After differentiating, we
obtain
∂
(
WDE −WCE)
∂pi
= p (2 + p (1− 2pi)) (WH −WL)−
p(1− PH) (2 + p(1− PH) (1− 2pi))
(
WO −WL) .
Noticing that (WH −WL) > (WO −WL), it is immediate to show that
this is positive for pi < 1
2
.
Consider the case of pi > 1
2
. As
∂(WDE−WCE)
∂pi2
< 0, we can evaluate
∂(WDE−WCE)
∂pi
at pi = 1 and verify if
∂(WDE−WCE)
∂pi
is still positive. That is,
∂
(
WDE −WCE)
∂pi
∣∣∣∣∣
pi=1
= p(2−p)(WH−WL)−(2−p(1−pH))p(1−PH)(WO−WL)
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A sufficient condition for this expression to be positive is p(2 − p) >
(2 − p(1 − pH))p(1 − pH). Notice that p and p(1 − pH) are values of
a more general function y = p′(2 − p′) which is a parabola increasing in
p′ for p′ < 1. Given that p > p(1−pH), it follows that ∂(W
DE−WCE)
∂pi
∣∣∣∣
pi=1
> 0.
This result emphasizes that the advantages of decentralization are rela-
tively more sensitive to increments in the proportion of E-types that those
associated with centralization. This is because centralization, as shown above,
offers fewer per-period corruption opportunities and therefore its welfare de-
pendence on the quality of politicians is milder than in the case of decen-
tralization. Interestingly, variations in pi may induce the population to shift
their preferences over centralization to decentralization. To investigate this,
we require first a better understanding of how pi is determined.
2.4 Career choice
We wish to link the quality of the political class with the evolution of the
private sector. Suppose all individuals in a society (both E-types and R-types)
decide whether to run for office or to stay in the private sector. Suppose further
that a person running for office and being elected cannot work in the private
sector while serving in office.12
Office rents under centralization and decentralization differ as the corrup-
tion and re-election opportunities take place in different states of the nature.
We defer the specific analysis on these rents to the next section where we
study regional politicians’ preferences over centralization. We maintain now
a general level of analysis and simply denote ER the combination of public
sector wage and ego rents derived by the E-type and RR the monetary rents
received by an R-type, when in office. Thus, individuals decide to run for the
election whenever their expected rents in office exceed their salary in the pri-
12In principle parliamentarians in some countries can still hold private jobs legally. How-
ever, we focus on those kinds of executive political positions whose degree of commitment
are incompatible with a serious involvement in private activities.
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vate sectors, which is given by wi. We assume wi be drawn from a continuous
probability distribution.
It follows that the fraction of individuals among E-types who decide to
become politicians is
P (ER > wi) = Φµ (ER) ,
while for the R-types,
P (RR > wi) = Φµ (RR)
where µ is a parameter that accounts for the development level of the Re-
gion. This could be, for example, the mean of wi or a bound of the distribution.
Hence, given that a fraction λ of the population is of an E-type, the pro-
portion of E-types that become politicians is:
pi =
λΦµ,σ2 (∆ (1 + p))
λΦµ,σ2 (∆ (1 + p)) + (1− λ) Φµ,σ2 (pCR)
Differentiating with respect to µ yields
∂pi
∂µ
=
λ (1− λ)
(
∂Φµ,σ2 (ER)
∂µ
1
Φµ,σ2 (ER)
− ∂Φµ,σ2 (RR)
∂µ
1
Φµ,σ2 (RR)
)
Φµ,σ2 (RR) Φµ,σ2 (ER) (λΦµ,σ2 (ER) + (1− λ) Φµ,σ2 (RR))2
Thus, the proportion of E-type politicians increases with the wages paid in
the private sector if the elasticity of the cumulative distribution function with
respect to µ is higher at ER than at RR. As a result, private sector develop-
ment raises the proportion of E-types for any distribution that respects this
condition. It turns out that this condition holds for the uniform distribution
and, most importantly, for the log-normal and Pareto distributions.
Proposition 3 Consider that wi is distributed according to any of the follow-
ing functions: Log-normal; Pareto; or Uniform. Then ∂pi
∂µ
> 0 if ER > RR.
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Proof See Appendix A.1.
The evolution of the private sector may generate variation in the quality of
the regional political class and imply that the development of the region affects
the preferences over centralization. A positive effect of the private sector on
the proportion of E-type politicians requires that the relative (opportunity)
cost of serving in office is greater for the R-types than for the E-types. When
this holds, the E-types will more rapidly lose interest in politics than the E-
types as a response to improvements in the private sector. Importantly, this
pro-efficiency re-allocation effect of the private sector depends on whether the
corruption rents generate lower utility to the R-politician than the ego-rents to
the E-types. As a corollary, an implication of our results is that in economies
with large corruption opportunities the development of the private sector will
have a negative effect on the quality of the government. An additional interest
of this result comes from the fact that the actual income distributions follow
a combination of a log-normal (for relatively low incomes) and a Pareto (for
sufficiently high incomes).
3 Rational Discontent
The possibility of changes in the quality of politicians and therefore in the
preferences over centralization or decentralization suggests that the majori-
ties supporting centralization may also vary over time. In some cases, moving
toward centralization or decentralization requires different majorities. If a ma-
jority of voters was in favor of centralization in the past, but the dissolution of
this scheme requires a larger majority (supermajority), it might be possible for
the region to be in a situation where a widespread discontent about centraliza-
tion is insufficient to move toward a decentralized system. It is even possible
that such discontent was anticipated at the moment of voting in favor of cen-
tralization, but that the disutility of such discontent was not strong enough
to discourage the vote for centralization. Thus, future discontent may be the
result of a rational decision by the individuals. This initial vote for central-
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ization could be enshrined in a constitution, whose rule changes often require
a supermajority. The later disaffection is reminiscent of the movements for
regional devolution in many parts of the world.13 Hence our model can shed
insights into these phenomena.
It is straightforward to construct an equilibrium in which the majority of
voters are “rationally” disaffected with centralization. In this scenario, voters
exhibit majoritarian but insufficient discontent. That is, P (uDEi2 −uCEi2 ≤ 0) ∈
[1− TSM , 12 ], where P (uDEi2 − uCEi2 ≤ 0) is the fraction of voters preferring cen-
tralization and TSM is a supermajority threshold. In this situation, discontent
with centralization would be rational if citizens voted for centralization in the
past (t = 1), even if unavoidable discontent was expected to occur in the future
(t = 2). This requires, P (uDEi1 − uCEi1 + uDEi2 − uCEi2 ≤ 0) > 12 .
To investigate the existence of rational discontent, we abandon the assump-
tion of identical voters. We consider that individual utilities are described by
ui = 2φiG
1
2 − τ + wi
where φi ∼ Φ[0,∞) captures the fact that individuals may differ in the
way they enjoy from public good consumption. Interestingly, we can asso-
ciate changes in Φ, and therefore in the majorities supporting centralization,
to economic development, changes in the distribution of income, or exoge-
nous changes in the preferences over public good consumption (provoked, for
example, by changes in the population age distribution).
Notice that if we additionally assume that the median of Φ is equal to 1,
the previous analysis goes through in contexts where the individuals vote to
determine the public good policy in every period.
Clearly, i would prefer centralization whenever uCWi −uNCWi > 0. We show
in the appendix A.2 that, after a bit of algebra and (innocuously) assuming
θL = 0, this expression becomes:
13Although the model is not, strictly speaking, valid for the European Union, this as-
pect strongly reminds, and perhaps explains, part of the rationale behind euroskeptical
movements in various European countries.
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uDEi − uCEi = (2φi − 1)
(
WDE −WCE) (6)
−2 (φi − 1)
(
θ
1
4
H
)(
2 (1− p)PLθ
1
4
H
)
,
where
WDE −WCE = WH [pip (2 + p (1− pi)) + 2 (1− p)PL − 2pPH ]
after replacing θL = 0 in equation (5). From equation (6), the preference
over centralization depends on the utility generated by the public good (φi)
and on the comparison between WDE and WCE. This identifies two sources
of change in the support for centralization: the quality of the political class,
as a main determinant of WDE −WCE, and the distribution of φi.
Notice that for the median φ, 6 only depends on WDE−WCE and thus, as
we show above, changes in pi may shift the preference of the median φ. Notice
however that 6 is not necessarily single-peaked in φ and therefore the median
φ does not necessarily express the preference of the majority. However, the
following lemma shows that this is indeed the case.
Lemma 1 The system providing the highest welfare with homogenous agents,
is majoritarian with heterogeneous agents.
Proof See Appendix A.3
For majoritarian but insufficient future discontent, it is required that
P
(
φi < φˆi
)
∈ [1
2
, 1− TSM ], (Condition RD1)
where φˆi is such that the individual i is indifferent between centralization
and decentralization. More explicitly, φˆi is defined by
φˆi =
pi2p (2 + p (1− pi2))− 2pPH − 2 (1− p)PL
2 (pi2p (2 + p (1− pi2))− 2pPH)
23
The fact that P
(
φi < φˆi
)
depends on Φ and φˆi identifies some channels
through which discontent may emerge. First, Φ may respond to ageing or
changes in income distribution. This would the case if we consider the public
good to be public expenditures involving health, social security or social bene-
fits. Second, φˆi depends on the quality of the political class and the structure
of shocks.14
We turn now to the possibility of Discounted Discontent. Using Lemma
1, it is straightforward to see that this situations requires WNCW1 −WCW1 +(
WNCW2 −WCW2
)
< 0. That is, after some manipulation,
WH (4 ((1− p)PL − pPH) + p (pi1(2 + p(1− pi1)) + pi2(2 + p(1− pi2)))) < 0
(Condition RD2)
The key mechanisms underlying this condition are the correlation between
the Center and the region, and the initial quality of the regional political
class. Notice that Condition RD2 is less likely to hold for high values of pi1 or
pi2 which imply lower gains from centralization and high values of PH which
increase the regional interest in centralization.
Summarizing the previous discussion leads to the following result:
Proposition 4 If Condition RD1 and Condition RD2 hold, then the region
under centralization is characterized by Rational Discontent.
The model is thus able to generate a situation where the future discontent
is discounted by initial supporters of centralization even if they would find
themselves unhappily stuck in a centralized regime in the future. Notice that
if individuals discounted the future, rational discontent would be more likely
to occur.
14For example, notice that φˆi is increasing in pi2 for pi2 <
p(1+p)
2 , which suggests that
widespread but insufficient support to decentralization is associated with an improving, yet
relatively poor political class.
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4 Discontent and Political Representation
We introduce political competition. Let n be the number of politicians in com-
petition. In absence of prior information about the incumbent, all candidates
have the same probability of being elected, 1
n
.
Following our previous analysis, each period in office the R-type can extract
corruption rents with probability p(1−PH) under centralization. As discussed
above, decentralization offers more corruption opportunities. These take place
with probability p. However, from the R-type’s perspective, centralization has
the advantage of generating situations where the public good provision reveals
no information about the incumbent’s type hence providing the possibility
of re-election. The probability of re-election for an R-type is (pPH + (1 −
p)PL
1
n
p(1 − PH). Overall, whether an R-type would prefer centralization or
decentralization will depend on the level of political competition. To show
this, the expected values of the R-types if in office are
V RCE(n) = p (1− PH)CR + (pPH + (1− p)PL)
1
n
p (1− PH)CR,
under centralization and
V EDE(n) = pCR
under decentralization. This means that an R-type prefers centralization for
n < (pPH + (1− p)PL) (1− PH)
PH
= nR
Recall that ∆ denoted the ego-rents from office derived by the E-type.
Under centralization, the E-type is re-elected with certainty with probability
p(1−PL). Re-election in also possible with probability 1n in the states of nature
where no information about the incumbents has been revealed. Again, this
happens with probability (pPH +(1−p)PL 1np(1−PH). Under decentralization
Re-election takes place with probability p. Thus, the payoffs in office of the
E-type under centralization and decentralization are
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V ECE(n) = ∆ + p (1− PH) ∆ + (pPH + (1− p)PL)
1
n
∆
V EDE(n) = (1 + p)∆
Hence, an E-type in office prefers CW if
n <
(pPH + (1− p)PL)
(1− PH) p = n
E
Thus,
Proposition 5 The regional political consensus is in favor of centralization
irrespective of voters’s preferences emerges for n < min{nR, nE}.
The intensity of political competition affects the preferences of politi-
cians over centralization and decentralization. When competition is low, the
prospects of re-election under centralization make this system be preferred
from the politicians’ viewpoint. Notice that the condition on the number of
candidates in competition is easily relaxed by assuming some level of incum-
bent’s advantage. In this case, it is more likely to find political consensus over
centralization.
This result is important to understand the possibility of unrepresented
discontent in situations where voters would prefer a decentralized regime. A
sufficiently small number of candidates generates an opposite consensus in
the political class. A small number of candidates facilitates as well collusion
between political candidates, which would guarantee that no candidate offers
a move toward decentralization. It may seem surprising that no candidate
includes decentralization in the platform if this is what voters actually prefer.
To see why this might happen, notice that the candidates’ types are un-
known, and hence proposal can potentially reveal the candidates’s type. To
sustain a pooling equilibrium where no candidate proposes decentralization,
all that is required is that a proposal for decentralization is believed with suf-
ficiently high probability to come from an R-type. Under this assumption,
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any candidate proposing decentralization would not be elected (because of the
welfare under decentralization with the certainty of an R-type is lower than
the ex-ante welfare associated with centralization. Notice that these out of
equilibrium (and hence arbitrary) beliefs would satisfy the intuitive criterion
developed by Cho and Kreps (1987).
The fact that the E-type politicians would prefer centralization in presence
of low levels of political competition involves the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Corruption opportunities are greater under centralization for low
levels of political competition.
In section 2.3 we show that centralization leads to lower corruption op-
portunities in a given period. However, as we just discussed, under central-
ization it is harder to detect corrupt incumbents. This is the reason why the
E-types would prefer centralization in regions where the incumbent faces a
sufficiently small number of challengers. Thus, we have shown that the de-
pendence between decentralization and corruption varies with the degree of
political competition.
5 Extentions and robustness checks
Here we sketch implications of some variations of our model.
• Full Centralization. We have analyzed an intermediate form of cen-
tralization. Full centralization would require a central bureaucracy in
charge of delivering the public good to the region. In this case, the re-
gional authority would find no corruption opportunities associated with
the provision of public good. This situation would make the R-type to be
in favor of decentralization. For the E-type this is less obvious. On the
one hand, the absence of control over the public good reduces the oppor-
tunities to signal honesty or efficiency. Moreover, when the delivery of
public good is exclusively a central government activity, citizens would
be less concerned about the regional government’s type. For this reason,
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an E-type politician would prefer a move toward centralization. On the
other hand, inasmuch the term in office is opaque about the incumbent’s
type, the probability of reelection only depends on the level of political
competition. That is, when political competition is low the incumbent
enjoys from a positive probability of being re-elected in all the states
of nature. This effect can make the E-type prefer full centralization to
decentralization. In any case, a clear effect of full centralization is that
it breaks potential political consensus over centralization unless the po-
litical class is composed of sufficiently few E-types. Full centralization
may also have a positive effect on the composition of the political class
since the development of the private sector would have a greater impact
on R-types than on E-types, which would reduce in turn the proportion
of R-types running for office.
As for the citizens, the advantages of full centralization would depend
on whether the central bureaucrat is more or less corrupt than (or as ef-
ficient as) local politicians. There is no clear reason why embezzlement
and capture would not be possible under full centralization. As discussed
above, whether the local government dominates the central bureaucracy
from the regional perspective will depend on a series of factors like ac-
countability, political competition, the importance of regional elites and
so on.
• Grants and Regional Redistribution. Assume 2 regions, a net re-
ceiver, region R, and a net contributor to public goods, region C. The
central authority taxes more the citizens of R than what is returned in
the form of funds for public goods. Therefore, the discontent over cen-
tralization is more widespread in C than in R. This discontent is clearly
illustrated by the fact that regions with stronger national sentiments
tend to be relatively wealthier. Notice that the preferences of the politi-
cal class over centralization do not depend on the level of public good or
taxation. Hence it is possible that an increase in regional redistribution
would lead to greater unrepresented discontent in region C. Finally, be-
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ing a net receiver can also influence the quality of the political class in
both regions in opposite directions. To see this, notice that the increase
of funding to R from the center would increase the value of corruption
rents. Suppose now that the inflow of resources changes the ranking of
ego and corruption rents. Further, suppose the increase in public good
provision raises the profitability in the private sector. In this case, as
shown in section 2.4, the E-types would relatively be less keen to become
politicians, which would lead to a worsening in the quality of the political
class in region R. The opposite would happen in region C.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied how the evolution of the economy impinges in
the reasons why citizens and politicians support or not fiscal centralization.
We do this in a model where, under centralization, the center decides but the
regions implement the policies. Since the center does not “touch” the money,
it can make decisions in a more neutral, albeit less informed, manner. This
produces a novel (in the literature) form of tradeoff between centralization and
descentralization. One central characteristic of the story is that the quality
of the political class in endogenous to the economic development process and
also determiines the “popularity” of centralization.
An important aspect for future research is to close the feedback loop be-
tween development and the quality of the political class. In our model, the
level of development affects the quality of the political class, and through it,
the benefits of each political system and social welfare. But it is easy to think
of circumstances in which the influence also flows in the other direction. That
is, the investment of politicians in public goods (e.g. education or R&D) can,
in turn, affect the level of development or the productivity of the economy.
The presence of both channels of influence could, for example, create multi-
ple steady states (leading perhaps to “poverty traps”) in the evolution of the
economy.
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A Appendices
A.1 Career Choice: distribution functions
A.1.1 The log-normal distribution
The cdf is given by
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∂Φµ,σ2 (x)
∂µ
1
Φµ,σ2 (x)
=
∫ x
0
2(lnu−µ)
2σ2
exp
(
− (lnu−µ)2
2σ2
)
du∫ x
0
exp
(
− (lnu−µ)2
2σ2
)
du
(7)
Then equation (7) becomes
= exp
(
−(lnx− µ)
2
2σ2
)
2(lnx−µ)
2σ2
∫ x
0
exp
(
− (lnu−µ)2
2σ2
)
du− ∫ x
0
2(lnu−µ)
2σ2
exp
(
− (lnu−µ)2
2σ2
)
du(∫ x
0
exp
(
− (lnu−µ)2
2σ2
)
du
)2
= exp
(
−(lnx− µ)
2
2σ2
) ∫ x
0
(
2(lnx−µ)
2σ2
− 2(lnu−µ)
2σ2
)
exp
(
− (lnu−µ)2
2σ2
)
du(∫ x
0
exp
(
− (lnu−µ)2
2σ2
)
du
)2
= exp
(
−(lnx− µ)
2
2σ2
) ∫ x
0
(
2(ln xu)
2σ2
)
exp
(
− (lnu−µ)2
2σ2
)
du(∫ x
0
exp
(
− (lnu−µ)2
2σ2
)
du
)2 > 0
A.1.2 The Pareto distribution
Φα (x) = 1− x−α
∂Φα (x)
∂ (−α) = −x
−α lnx
∂Φα (∆ (1 + p))
∂ (−α)
1
Φα (∆ (1 + p))
− ∂Φα (pCR)
∂ (−α)
1
Φα (pCR)
= −(∆ (1 + p))
−α ln (∆ (1 + p))
1− (∆ (1 + p))−α +
(pCR)−α ln (pCR)
1− (pCR)−α
Since − (x)−α ln(x)
1−(x)−α is increasing in x, the result also follows for the Pareto dis-
tribution.
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A.1.3 The uniform distribution
The salary in the private sector is wi, where wi is drawn independently for
each citizen from a distribution which takes values uniformly in [ζ, ξ]. The
value ζ changes with the level of development of each particular economy. For
an E-type, whose rents from being a politician are ER this means that the
fraction of individuals of the group who decide to become politicians is
P (ER > wi) =
ER− ζ
ξ − ζ
For an R-type whose political rents are RR
P (RR > wi) =
RR− ζ
ξ − ζ
Hence, given that a fraction λ of the population is egomaniac, we have that
the proportion of good politicians is:
pi =
λ (ER− ζ)
λ (ER− ζ) + (1− λ) (RR− ζ)
Hence
∂pi
∂ζ
=
−λ (λ (ER− ζ) + (1− λ) (RR− ζ)) + λ (ER− ζ)
(λER + (1− λ) (RR)− ζ)2
=
λ (1− λ) (ER− ζ)− λ (1− λ) (RR− ζ)
(λER + (1− λ)RR− ζ)2
=
λ (1− λ) (ER−RR)
(λER + (1− λ)RR− ζ)2
Thus, the fraction of e-type politicians increases with the level of develop-
ment (measured by the worst outside option feasible to a citizen) as long as
expected ego-rents ER are larger than the expected corruption rents RR.
A.2 Rational discontent
Notice the following:
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ui (H) = (2φi − 1)WH
ui (L) = (2φi − 1)WL
ui (I) = (2φi − 1)W I + 2 (φi − 1)
(
(θHθL)
1
4 −W I
)
ui (O) = (1− pi)
(
(2φi − 1)WL
)
+
pi
(
(2φi − 1)C + 2 (φi − 1)
(
(θHθL)
1
4 −WO
))
It follows that
uDEi − uCEi = (2φi − 1)
(
WDE −WCE)
−2 (φi − 1)
(
θ
1
4
H − θ
1
4
L
)(
2 (1− p)PLθ
1
4
H − p2(1− PH)2 (1− pi)pi2θ
1
4
L
)
,
where WDE − WCE is defined by (5). Let us assume θL = 0 to make the
comparison easier. In this case, equation (5) becomes
WDE −WCE = WH [pip (2 + p (1− pi)) + 2 (1− p)PL − 2pPH ] (8)
and
uDEi − uCEi = (2φi − 1)WH (pip (2 + p (1− pi)) + 2 (1− p)PL − 2pPH)
−2 (φi − 1)WH (2 (1− p)PL)
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 2 The system of public good provision providing the highest (expected)
welfare in the case of homogenous individuals, it is the one supported by the
majority when individuals are heterogeneous.
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Proof Inspecting (8), we find that all individuals with φi >
1
2
prefer
decentralization if WDE −WCE > 0 whenever
PH < pi
(
1 +
p
2
(1− pi)
)
. (9)
Importantly, this condition is satisfied by the condition required for WDE−
WCE > 0, which is
pi2p (2 + p (1− pi2)) + 2pPH − 2 (1− p)PL > 0. (10)
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